member of a strong and independent National Guard, an organization dedicated to serving its citizens at home and abroad. While the Guard is a vital component of the national security strategy, its current role as a significant provider of personnel to traditional active component missions compromises the institution's ability to continue to serve its local citizens as a ready and relevant reserve component.
The Department of Defense's no-notice transformation of the National Guard from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve has endangered America's oldest military institution. The current use of the National Guard as an expeditionary force, and the persistent underfunding of this valuable resource, continue to jeopardize its ability to man, train and equip America's largest homeland defense force. An operational National Guard under resourced and over utilized is a National Guard at risk; and when you risk the Guard, you risk America.
RISKING THE GUARD: RISKING AMERICA
The current pattern of using the reserves is endangering this valuable asset, and reforming laws and policies will be necessary to reverse the damage done and make the operational reserve sustainable. 1 -Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, January 31, 2008 The use of the National Guard as an operational reserve is unsustainable, unrealistic and places our nation in unprecedented peril. The overnight, no-notice 2 transformation of this vital military resource from a strategic to operational reserve compromises the basic underpinnings of the Constitution's intent for a strong and independent militia. While several key defense leaders and academics opine that the current debate concerning the designation of reserve component transformation is "largely artificial and unproductive" 3 , this essay challenges that position by examining valid arguments and evidence to the contrary.
The continued underfunding and over utilization of the National Guard, specifically the Army National Guard, has stretched this valuable organization beyond our national leaders' willingness to adequately man, train and equip the already depleted force. The Guard's ability to maintain long-term operational competence as both a forward expeditionary force and homeland defense element is, arguably, an extremely challenging and most likely unreachable objective. Furthermore, with the implementation of the operational Guard and the elimination of the strategic reserve, defense policy makers have violated the doctrinally sound and historically tested use of reserve forces in the "grand strategy" of defending America. 4 Moreover, the increasing reliance on the operationalized Guard as an active force replacement pool and the persistent practice of internal cross-leveling of both personnel and equipment pushes this national asset to the breaking point. The exhaustive "federalization" of the Guard, made possible by emergent policies, laws and practices, increasingly impede state governors' ability to provide rapid and effective response to statewide, regional and national catastrophic events.
This essay will begin by presenting the Department of Defense (DOD) directive that outlines the purpose, principles and policies that outline the utilization of the reserve components as an operational reserve. Secondly, based on the nine objectives of the DOD directive, this examination will measure the progress and prospect of strategic to operational transformation of the Army National Guard within current and projected fiscal constraints, expeditionary force requirements and homeland defense imperatives.
Finally, this analysis will examine the ends, ways and means and address the feasibility, While this "rebalancing" effort adds additional responsibilities to the National Guard, it has not reduced expectations that the Guard will continue to provide a wide range of capabilities that include warfighting, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and post-conflict and transitional operations such as democracy building and stability operations. Rebalancing efforts continue to drive National Guard strategic to operational transformation.
Guard transformation is codified, although well after its implementation, in Nine key objectives are specified in the directive, they are: 6. Voluntary duty is encouraged to meet mission requirements.
7. The Reserve Components are resourced to meet readiness requirements.
Resource Component resourcing plans shall ensure visibility to track resources from formulation, appropriation, and allocation through execution.
8. Outreach services are established and available for Reserve Component members, their families, and employers from pre-activation though reintegration.
9. Homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities are total force missions. Unity of effort is maintained consistent with statutory responsibilities in operations involving federal forces and non-federalized National Guard forces with federal forces under federal command and control and nonfederalized National Guard forces under state command and control.
This DOD directive applies to all reserve components; however, this essay will focus specifically on the nine principles and policies as they relate to the National Guard and expressly the Army National Guard as an operational force. The Army Guard has felt the greater impact of strategic to operational transformation by way of contributing the largest number of reserve component personnel and equipment to overseas missions and, consequently, reducing the assets available for homeland defense requirements.
The Army Guard Provides Operational Capabilities and Strategic Depth across the Full Spectrum of Conflict
The Army National Guard clearly meets the first objective of the operational directive by providing a significant combat and combat support presence across the full spectrum of conflict. Specifically, as a part of the Army's brigade-centric force, the Modular Force, the Army National Guard will by 2012 resource 28 brigade combat teams, 46 multifunctional brigades, 38 functional brigades and 17 tactical combat forces. 9 Army leadership consistently recognizes the Army National Guard as an essential and integral component of the Army in the joint and interagency efforts to win the war, secure the homeland, and provide disaster relief at home and abroad.
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However, can the Army National Guard meet the requirements of the DOD directive while retaining strategic depth and remaining an operational force capable of conducting expeditionary and homeland responsibilities? An analysis of the Army Guard's expeditionary role and examination of its utility as a conventional reserve force challenge the validity of this operational directive.
As a component to our national defense strategy, the Army National Guard performs its role as a significant provider of expeditionary forces around the globe.
Provided by law, the President of the United States exercises authority to federalize the National Guard, and by this authority may direct the Guard to conduct operations on foreign soil. The concept of the reserve force has a precise military meaning. At all levels of battle, commanders are enjoined to hold a force in reserve.
Committing all forces to the battle, whether it is a squad-level engagement or a multi-division action, is understood to be extraordinarily dangerous. When the reserve is committed, the commander's options contract. If he faces a sudden threat or opportunity, he has no resources with which to counter or exploit it." The doctrine of "never fully committing one's reserve is central to good military practice.
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Clausewitz writes, "A reserve has two purposes. One is to prolong and renew the action; the second to counter unforeseen threats…the need to hold a force in readiness for emergencies may also arise in strategy" 16 Deploying significant numbers of National Guard personnel in the onset and throughout, Operations' Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom may meet active force personnel deficits; however, its use appears to violate the very tenants of successful war practice.
The Army National Guard may arguably meet the first operational directive by providing additional combat and combat related resources to current defense requirements; however, by doing so it sacrifices its ability to provide, as the directive requires, strategic depth. In essence, the Army National Guard lacks the ability to do prolonged forward engagements while preserving indispensable strategic capability.
The Army Guard as Total Force asset.
The second objective of DOD Directive 1200.17 reinforces Total Force
Integration in support of the management of the Army National Guard as an operational force. Indeed, the modern militia has truly evolved into a more sophisticated and much more relied upon instrument of national defense. Like all reserve components, the Army National Guard provides not only ready forces capable of performing full-spectrum operations, it also contributes soldiers possessing a wealth of civilian acquired skills valuable for missions at home and abroad. Moreover, the Army National Guard has historically been a cost-effective force that provides a daily connection between the military and the civilian community. Reserve Centers and National Guard Armories throughout the nation. 24 Author Phillip
Carter writes, These closures will change the relationship between the U.S. military and the society from which it's drawn. Many of these reserve centers, armories, and defense offices play an important role in their communities' lives-reserve armories frequently serve as local meeting halls and polling places, and reserve units often engage in community service projects, for example. When these bases go away, so too will the presence of the military in the lives of the people who reside and work near them. Initially, reservists may drive hours to drill with units at the new consolidated armory locations, but eventually these reservists will move nearer the big bases or quit the reserves. Either way, communities that today contribute reservists to the military will no longer do so. 25 In concurrence with BRAC closures, Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, the director of the Army National Guard, recently directed the closure of 150 armories. He cited that it was required in order to fill units to 91 percent under force transition requirements. 26 The loss of the "local armory" will require soldiers to travel away from their hometown facilities, diminish the effectiveness of family and employer programs presented at those facilities and further distance National Guard homeland defense assets from the supported population. Moreover, this outcome will undoubtedly affect future efforts to recruit, retain and train an operationalized or strategic Army Guard force.
Essential to supporting a citizen based militia is the concept known as continuum of service. Continuum of services allows individuals to move seamlessly from active to reserve status and back to meet the changing needs of the service member and the services." 27 In realty, moving "seamlessly" between a civilian occupation and a military career is a difficult task under the most favorable circumstances. Under current "operational" conditions, escalating military requirements, combined with growing civilian employment uncertainties, often force Army Guard members to choose between Guard careers and success in a civilian job. 28 As a consequence of these dual commitments, recent data (Fiscal Year 2008) reflects that 6,000 Captains and 3000
Majors have chosen to discontinue military service with the Army National Guard. Predictably, the reliance on National Guard as an operational force will not lessen with twenty first century challenges at home and abroad, and neither will the need to attract and retain Guard membership at effective levels. However, with declining recruiting eligibility pools and an increased competition for eligible recruits, the Army National Guard will be hard-pressed to find willing and qualified recruits to meet future operational guard recruitment objectives.
Illustrative of the youth eligibility predicament, Undersecretary of Defense, Dr.
David Chu points out, "We should not lose sight of the fact that, although the youth population is large, a relatively small proportion of American youth is qualified to The persistent cross-leveling of personnel to fill strength deficient units and the failure to adhere to the force generation model are two major contributing factors to the unsustainable of the operational Guard. A third more significant factor, the lack of adequate resourcing, will be closely examined as follows.
The Army Guard is Resourced to Meet Readiness Requirements
Meeting the intent of the seventh operational directive may be the DOD's most significant challenge. Efforts to fully resource, and in many cases restore, the Army emergencies." 57 Moreover, Governors continue to express their concern for the lack of serviceability of National Guard equipment remaining within their respective borders.
California Governor Schwarzenegger stated, "Every time our National Guard leaves, they take with them equipment but they don't bring it back… there's only so long they can do that…I think it is not fair to the state for the federal government to go into a war situation and then to take from us the equipment." 58 Meanwhile, national leaders continue to vacillate from optimism to frustration in regards to equipment replenishment. give the commensurate resources to go with that, you will have nothing." 66 Specifically, the DOD directive states, "reserve components are resourced to meet readiness requirements." 67 Essential to that effort and fundamental to strategic to operational transformation sustainment is the ability to shape the future force to meet current mission requirements and provide funding flexibility for unforeseen contingencies.
Outreach Services are Established and Available for the Army Guard
The eighth operational objective of DOD Directive 1200.17 acknowledges the importance of providing outreach services to reserve component members, their families and employers from "pre-activation through reintegration." Unfortunately this DOD directive falls well short of its stated purpose by failing, eight years after operational force implementation, to provide "reachable" and sustainable services for In accordance with this concept, managing crisis and restoring order within the nation's community should be accomplished at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. 76 With its unique presence in our communities and as our nation's first military responder, the American citizen expects the National Guard to provide a timely and reliable response to domestic emergencies. Implicit to that understanding is that the citizensoldier will be present to provide that response. The increased federalization of the Army Guard, especially as a major expeditionary force provider, fails to adequately support the Governors' use of the Guard in current homeland security strategies. Robert Gates issued a memo to his top department leaders to conduct a broad review to determine if the National Guard and Reserve can adequately deal with domestic disasters and whether they have the training and equipment to defend the homeland.
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The CNGR determined that the current use of the National Guard jeopardizes its doctrinal role as a military reserve, and further, the overuse of the Guard as an expeditionary force has seriously impacted its ability to provide properly trained and equipped personnel in defense of the homeland. 79 Implicit to this requirement is a concerted effort to keep the Guard at home.
Conclusion
The operational Guard, as part of the Total Army, provides capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict. In doing so, the operational Guard provides the nation an enhanced expeditionary warfighting capacity while maintaining a responsibility to provide homeland defense, security and support to civilian authorities. By ascribing to DOD Directive 1200.17, defense leaders are provided an overarching set of policies that promote and support the management of the Guard as an operational force. Fully implemented, these policies shape an operational force fully capable of providing fully manned, trained and equipped units to a forward conflict or homeland disaster.
However, several years past the implementation of the operational Guard, the force remains chronically under resourced. Fully implementing this operational objective will require substantial budgetary outlays. The means to sustain an operational force must go beyond its reliance on defense supplementals. Furthermore, the National Guard, specifically the Army Guard, can no longer afford to meet readiness objectives by cross-leveling personnel and equipment to meet "eleventh hour" DOD deployment requirements.
The implementation of an operational Guard is feasible with a tremendous expenditure of resources provided across a wide category of support systems prudently managed and properly resourced. The Army Guard is fully capable of performing as an effective combat expeditionary force and a responsive homeland support asset.
However, the acceptability of using the Guard as a forward and prolonged expeditionary force is debatable. A military in reserve has a doctrinally prescribed use in military operations. The transformation of the Guard to operational force has reduced its strategic significance. Moreover, the perception of the demise of the citizen-soldier, arguably, is unacceptable to the American public which relies on the National Guard to maintain relevance and connectivity to the local community. Finally, the operational Guard is unsustainable due to tight fiscal limitations which severely restrict maintaining critical readiness levels. Chairman of the CNGR opines, "this is worse than the worst readiness days of the hollow force in the late '70s and the early '80s." 80 Continuing on this path, the erosion of the operational Guard will render it unsuitable to perform even the most fundamental missions. Compounding that dilemma will be fiscal uncertainties.
The Army Guard has traditionally offered the taxpayer a superb economic advantage; quite simply…a part-time force costs less. In fact, while the Army National
Guard is over 30 percent of the Total Army force, it is a mere 12 percent of the total Army budget. 81 However, sustaining an operational force that has increased its workload seven fold 82 over the past seven years will be a significant challenge for budget planners and a heavy liability for the American taxpayer.
And finally, perhaps the biggest burden the American citizen may bear is reliance on a depleted Army National Guard incapable of providing its core mission -protecting the homeland. Unless significant systemic flaws in the implementation of the operational Guard are addressed, or policy makers reconstitute the strategic reserve, the America people will risk the loss of an effective National Guard force…and when you risk the Guard you risk America. 
